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RECENT DECISIONS
supported on the theory of the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV,
section 2, which outlaws discrimination
by one state against citizens of another.
The questions raised by the case fall more
within the 'scope of the decisions in
Ward, McCready, Toomer, and Blake,
rather than Thompson and Green. Under
the former cases it would appear that a
proper ratio must be established between
the percentage of taxes paid and the
benefits received. However, unlike the
earlier cases, we are here involved not
with privileges and immunities that arise
from United States citizenship but those
that are specifically provided by a par-
ticular state for its own citizens.
The fundamental significance of the
instant case is in the fact that it estab-
lished a workable test to be used when
applying the equal protection clause of
Applicability of Sixth Amendment
Guarantees to Military Proceedings
Defendant appealed from an order of
the United States District Court of Kan-
sas dismissing his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus which had been brought
on the grounds that, at his special court-
martial, he had been denied his sixth
and fifth amendment guarantees as well
as those of military due process in that
he was assigned a non-legally trained of-
ficer in response to his request for quali-
the fourteenth amendment to constitu-
tional challenges against residency re-
quirements for welfare benefits. The
classification and purpose of the statute
are now to be investigated. Such a test
appears to validly protect the rights of the
individual because, if properly applied,
the actual intent of an applicant will be
investigated before any decision as to the
availability of benefits is determined.
However, the problem which remains is
whether or not the state may validly
restrict aid to its own domiciliaries. In
light of the greater burdens that are now
being placed upon state treasuries to
provide adequate services to residents of
a particular state, it would seem that a
legitimate requirement may be legislated,
i.e., one which reasonably protects the
state against the fraud of an applicant
but legitimately balances against this the
true intent of the individual.
fled counsel.' The United States Court
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, in affirming
the dismissal of the petition, held that
the defendant's sixth amendment rights
had not been denied since the crime for
which the accused had been charged was
equivalent to a misdemeanor at civil law
and the sixth amendment's assistance of
counsel provision had not, as yet, been
1 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (1964) (Article 27(c)
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ]).
interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court as applying to misdemeanors.
Furthermore, the Court found the ac-
cused not to have been deprived of a fair
trial in violation of the fifth amendment
since, as required by statute, trial and
defense counsel were equally qualified
in terms of legal training. Kennedy v.
Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.
1967).
Twelve days later, in another case,
the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals reached an apparently conflicting
conclusion. There, the accused was tried
and convicted by a general court-martial.
At the custodial interrogation, the de-
fendant requested that counsel be ap-
pointed to represent him but the Staff
Judge Advocate refused to appoint an
attorney at the investigatory stage, not-
ing that the defendant had the right to
retain civilian counsel at his own ex-
pense. The defendant was otherwise in-
formed of all his rights under the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice. The
Court of Military Appeals, in reversing
petitioner's conviction, recognized that
members of the armed services are not
automatically deprived of their Bill of
Rights guarantees and held that the prin-
ciples enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court with respect to the right
to counsel are of constitutional dimension
and hence applicable to military interro-
gations of criminal suspects. Pursuant
to these principles, the Court found that
the defendant had the right to be repre-
sented by appointed counsel at the pre-
trial interrogation. United States v.
Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R.
249 (1967).
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Congress was given the power to
"make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forc-
es' 2 to insure supremacy of the civil
government over the military. This
grant, in conjunction with the wording
of the Fifth Amendment of the Consti-
tution, which provides that no person
shall answer for an infamous crime with-
out indictment by a grand jury "except
in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public dan-
ger" 3 is generally viewed as the source
of authority for court-martial proceed-
ings.' Given this power to regulate the
armed forces, Congress took the position
that it was not limited by any of the
Bill of Rights guarantees, 5 a position not
without strong historical support.
All the early American Articles of
War,' which were derived from the Brit-
ish Articles of War,7 contain no provision
for even allowing the presence of counsel
at court-martial proceedings. Not until
the American Articles of War of 18068
can anything resembling a right of counsel
be found. Article 69 of this Act pro-
vided that the judge advocate as prose-
cutor for the United States "shall so far
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See generally War-
ren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 185-86 (1962).
3U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 See, e.g., W. WINTHRoP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS 48 (2d ed. 1920).
5Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen
Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
127, 128 (1964).
6Reprinted in WINTHROP, supra note 4, at 953.
7Id. at 931.
8 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, arts. 1-101, 2
Stat. 359.
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consider himself as counsel for the pris-
oner . . . as to object to any leading
question to any of the witnesses or any
question to the prisoner, the answer to
which might tend to criminate him-
self. . . ." 9
Army Regulations in 1835 provided
that while an attorney was allowed to be
present, he could not directly participate
in the proceedings. 10 As an early treat-
ise writer noted, "counsel are not to...
offer the slightest remark, much less to
lead or argue. . . . [A] lawyer . . . is
tolerated, as a friend of the person to
assist him by advice in preparing questions
for witnesses, in taking notes and shaping
his defence.""'
Since Congress' power to create such
tribunals arose independently of the ju-
dicial articles of the Constitution, a
court-martial was not considered a court
as that term is understood in civil phrase-
ology and thus was not to be limited by
the provisions of the sixth amendment. 12
While Blackstone's statement that "he
puts not off the citizen when he enters
the camp; but it is because he is a citi-
zen, and would wish to continue so, that
he makes himself for a while a soldier"'13
remains true, the rights of the individual
citizen always give way to the necessity
9 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, art. 69, 2 Stat.
367.
10 ARMY REG. art. XXX § 34, at 96 (1835).
"1 A. MACOMB, THE PRACTICE OF COURTS MAR-
TIAL §§ 43, 93 (1840) reprinted in Wiener,
Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The
Original Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38
(1958).
12 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECE-
DENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920).
13 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 408 (Wen-
dell ed.).
of enforcing military discipline. Indeed,
Chief Justice Warren recently stated that
the military establishment has been given
broad power to deal with its own per-
sonnel because
courts are ill-equipped to determine the
impact upon discipline that any par-
ticular intrusion upon military authority
might have. Many of the problems of
the military society are, in a sense, alien
to the problems with which the judiciary
is trained to deal. 14
This "hands-off" doctrine, which has
continued basically intact, was first enun-
ciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Ex parte Vallandigham."5 There,
petitioner, a civilian, had made a speech
critical of the government's handling of
the Civil War. The speech was found to
be in violation of a regulation promul-
gated by the head of the area military
department. In refusing to review the
petitioner's conviction, the Court held
that it had no power to review by certior-
ari the proceedings of a military commis-
sion appointed by an officer commanding
a military department since such an ap-
plication was not from a suit "in law or
equity within the meaning of . . . the
3d article of the Constitution. Nor is a
military commission a court within the
meaning of the 14th section of the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789."6
Hence, the Supreme Court seemingly
divested itself of any power it might have
had, either constitutional or statutory, to
'4 Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962).
15 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863).
I1d. at 251.
inquire into the judgments of military
tribunals. However, three years later, a
nearly identical fact pattern arose except
that a peacetime background now pre-
vailed. The Supreme Court, in Ex parte
Milligan,1 7 granted an application for a
writ of habeas corpus requested by a
civilian tried by a military tribunal for
promoting rebellion in an area that had
not been and was not being threatened
with enemy occupation. Although dis-
cipline is a necessity for achieving mili-
tary efficiency and, therefore, Congress
can prescribe modes of trial as it sees fit,
nevertheless all civilians are guaranteed
the right of trial in their respective state
courts where such are open and operat-
ing. At first glance, these cases seemed
contradictory but are reconcilable since
in Vallandigham the Supreme Court said
it did not have jurisdiction to inquire
into the merits whereas in Milligan it
felt that the military had no jurisdiction
over the person sentenced.
Refinement of the jurisdictional basis
for inquiring into military proceedings
came in Ex parte Reed.' There, the de-
fendant was tried by a general court-
martial, found guilty of malfeasance, and
had sentence imposed. The reviewing au-
thority demanded that a higher sentence
be provided and this was done. In affirm-
ing the lower court's denial of a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
because the military court had jurisdiction
over the person, the cause, and the sen-
tence imposed, it could look no further
17 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
Is 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
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into the record.' 9
The principle that judgments of a mili-
tary tribunal cannot be collaterally at-
tacked once the requisite jurisdictional
requirements have been satisfied con-
tinued unchallenged until the World War
II era.20 At that time a series of Supreme
Court decisions enlarging upon the ap-
plicability of the sixth amendment as
applied to civilians as well as certain
extra-judicial factors led to attempts to
either expand the classical test of juris-
dictional inquiry by the civil judiciary or
to internally reform military due process.
In 1932, the Supreme Court decided
Powell v. Alabama,21 in which it held
that in a capital case arising in a state
court where the defendant is indigent
and incapable of effectively defending
himself, the court must assign counsel
whether requested or not. The reasoning
of Powell was followed by Johnson v.
Zerbst,22  where the defendant was
129"Whatever was done . . we must presume
was properly done. If error was committed in
the rightful exercise of authority, we cannot
correct it." Id. at 23. Accord, Keyes v. United
States, 109 U.S. 336 (1883) (habeas corpus
denied where the general court-martial had satis-
fied the jurisdictional requirements even though
one of its members was a witness for the pros-
cution); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890)
(grant of habeas corpus reversed where the
military court had met jurisdiction even though
it incorrectly interpreted a statute).
2 0 See, e.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296,
304 (1911), cited with approval in United States
ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 344
(1922): 'To those in the military . . . the
military law is due process. The decision, there-
fore, of a military tribunal acting within the
scope of its lawful powers cannot be reviewed
or set aside by the courts."
21 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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charged with feloniously possessing and
uttering counterfeit money. The Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment
meant that, in federal courts, counsel
must be provided for those unable to
employ such counsel unless the right is
competently and intelligently waived. The
Court concluded that failure to provide
such counsel would create a jurisdictional
bar to conviction and sentencing which
may be collaterally attacked in a habeas
corpus proceeding.
Not long after these decisions, the low-
er federal courts began to apply the new
standard in reversing a number of court-
martial convictions 23 despite the fact that
the Supreme Court had held in Betts v.
Brady 24 that the sixth amendment did
not require the states to furnish indigent
defendants with counsel. In effect, it
seemed that a deprivation of the "Assist-
ance of Counsel" guarantee added a new
element to the jurisdictional inquiry into
court-martial proceedings. The absence
of such assistance would apparently have
created a bar to prosecution. 25
In 1950, however, in Hiatt v. Brown,26
the Supreme Court reaffirmed the tradi-
tional limitations on judicial inquiry into
military matters. There, the lower court
was presented with a record replete with
the errors of reliance on inapplicable law,
2:See, e.g., Anthony v. Hunter, 71 F. Supp.
823 (D. Kan. 1947) (inexperienced officers
appointed counsel); Shapiro v. United States,
69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947) (failure to
provide counsel).
24 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
25 Note, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Be-
fore Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 127,
131 (1964).
26339 U.S. 103 (1950).
token defense, and conviction for murder
without proof of malice, premeditation or
deliberation. 27 In granting habeas corpus
relief, the lower court applied due process
under civilian standards holding that were
it not to do so the fifth amendment guar-
antees would no longer apply in federal
courts. In reversing, the Supreme Court
restated the classical view that the civil-
ian courts can exercise no supervisory
power over court-martial proceedings,
that any errors committed are for the
military to arrest and that the single in-
quiry must remain jurisdiction. 28
The door to the courts being effectively
closed to any relief on a constitutional
basis, extra-judicial events required a
modification in the traditional theory of
military autonomy. Soldiers returning
from the war told of unnecessary displays
of arbitrariness by their superiors. More
importantly, the scope of our military
strength had increased tremendously since
colonial days. Every male was now a
potential member of the armed forces
with time spent on active enlistment and
on reserve duty consuming significant por-
tions of their lives.2 9 Thus, the Articles
27 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949).
28 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1950),
citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890)
and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (pur-
suant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, giving the right
to punish "Offenses against the Law of Nations,"
Congress could by military tribunals punish
foreign officers for war crimes).
21 For an analysis of the events leading up to
the expansion of servicemen's rights, see White,
The Background and the Problem, 35 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 197 (1961); Warren, The Bill of
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV.
181, 187-88 (1961).
of War of 1806,30 which had governed
the discipline of American soldiers, with
only minor revisions in 1916 31 and
1920,32 was replaced in 1950 by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.13
Under the UCMJ three kinds of courts-
martial exist. The first is a general court-
martial which is composed of not less
than five members and a law officer. 3'
This court has the power to adjudge
any punishment including death when
specifically authorized and, under the law
of war, may try any person subject to
trial by military tribunal and adjudge any
punishment permitted by the law of
war.
3 5
The second type of court-martial, de-
signated as special, consists of not less
than three members and may impose a
bad conduct discharge as well as any
other penalty not forbidden, except death,
dishonorable discharge, imprisonment for
more than six months, hard labor with-
out confinement for over three months,
and certain salary forfeitures beyond a
stated maximum.3 6 The penalties which
a special court-martial may impose are
thus limited to the length of sentence
30 Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, arts. 1-101, 2
Stat. 359.
31 Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, arts. 1-121, 39
Stat. 650.
32Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, arts. 1-121, 41
Stat. 787.
33 Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, arts. 1-139, 64
Stat. 144, as amended, Act of Aug. 10, 1956,
ch. 1041, arts. 1-121, 70A Stat. 78, now, 10
U.S.C. §§801-972 (1964).
"4 10 U.S.C. §816(1) (1964). For the duties
of the law officer, see 10 U.S.C. § 826(a)-(b)
(1964).
35 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964).
31 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
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which may be imposed for conviction of
a misdemeanor at civil law. 37
For each general and special court-
martial, the authority convening the court
shall detail trial and defense counsel
which, at a general court-martial, must
be a judge advocate or a law specialist
who is a graduate of an accredited law
school or member of the federal bar or
bar of the highest court of a state and
must be certified as competent by his
respective Judge Advocate General. 38
The UCMJ also provides that in the case
of a special court-martial, neither trial
nor defense counsel need be of that class
that can be qualified in a general court-
martial, but if the trial counsel is qualified
to act before a general court-martial or
is qualified to act in all respects before
a general court-martial except for a lack
of certification, then defense counsel must
be similarly qualified.39
The last type of court-martial is the
summary court-martial and consists of
one commissioned officer with authority
over all persons subject to this chapter
for any non-capital offense, except of-
37Compare 10 U.S.C. §819 (1964) with N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 55.102(e).
's10 U.S.C. §827(b) (1964).
1910 U.S.C. §827(c)(1)-(2) (1964). When
the prosecutor is not qualified to practice be-
fore a general court-martial, or qualified but
not certified, compare Application of Stapley,
246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) (appoint-
ment of non-legally trained counsel at special
court-martial held inconsistent with the sixth
amendment) with Le Ballister v. Warden, 247
F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965) (sixth amendment
inapplicable since any existing right to counsel
arises from the power of Congress and therefore
legally trained counsel not necessary at special
court-martial proceedings).
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ficers, cadets, and midshipmen. However,
no person may be tried before it over
his objection unless he has chosen this
forum in lieu of a commanding officer's
nonjudicial punishment. 40  The penalties
that may be imposed are more severely
limited, with confinement and pay for-
feitures approximately between one-third
and one-sixth of those imposable by a
special court-martial.4 1  As previously
mentioned, a commanding officer may
impose a nonjudicial punishment which
approximately equals, in severity, though
in greater specificity, the penalties that
may be imposed by summary courts-
martial. 42
The UCMJ also provides that no serv-
iceman may be tried by a court-martial
any member of which is his junior, nor
may any member of any court-martial be
an accuser, witness for the prosecution, or
have acted as investigation officer or as
counsel in the same case.4 3 Compulsory
self-incrimination is prohibited in the
court-martial and in the pre-trial inter-
rogation and no person is allowed to in-
terrogate without informing the accused
of the nature of the accusation against
him; that the accused need make no
statement; and that any statement made
may be used against him in evidence.
Any statement elicited in violation of
this article is inadmissible evidence. 44
Finally, according to statute, the accused
must be represented by counsel in his
defense before a general or special court-
40 10 U.S.C. §820 (1964).
41 10 U.S.C. §§ 819, 820 (1964).
42 10 U.S.C. §815 (1964).
43 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (1964).
44 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
martial which may consist of either civil-
ian counsel if provided by him, or by
military counsel of his own choosing if
reasonably available, or by the defense
counsel detailed under 10 U.S.C. § 827.4 5
It is to be perceived, therefore, that in
1950, military process had far surpassed
civilian due process as applied to the
states. Thereafter, decisions of the Su-
preme Court expanding inquiry into mili-
tary matters and applying the sixth
amendment to the states tended to close
the gap between military and civil justice.
The landmark case in this area is Burns
v. Wilson.4 6 There, petitioners were tried
separately before a general court-martial,
found guilty of murder, and sentenced to
death. After all military remedies were
exhausted, petitioners applied for and
were denied habeas corpus relief in the
district court on the ground that the
military tribunal had jurisdiction in the
traditional sense. The court of appeals
affirmed, but only after reviewing the evi-
dence. In affirming the lower court's de-
nial of the writ of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court held that the "military
courts, like the state courts, have the
same responsibilities as do the federal
courts to protect a person from a viola-
45 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964). Compare the
language of that statute requiring that the de-
fendant be represented by assigned defense
counsel with Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requiring that counsel be
appointed only if defendant is indigent. For a
concise discussion of the absolute burden on the
military to appoint counsel see Quinn, The
United States Court of Military Appeals and
Military Due Process, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
225, 237 (1961).
46346 U.S. 137 (1953).
tion of his constitutional rights." 47 Where
the military had given a fair considera-
tion to all the claims raised by the peti-
tioner, it was not up to a federal civil
court to re-evaluate. The dissent argued
that it was not enough to determine that
the military had considered the claims
where it was clear that an incorrect result
had been reached.
The significance of this case is the
addition of a new element to the tradi-
tional jurisdictional inquiry. Now the
federal courts can inquire into whether
the military has given a fair hearing to
claims raised by the accused. Conse-
quently, the Court of Military Appeals has
generally taken it upon itself to quickly
follow suit with respect to the new pro-
nouncements concerning individual rights
by the Supreme Court. For example, in
Chandler v. Fretag,'4 a state criminal ac-
tion wherein petitioner had been denied a
continuance in response to his request to
obtain counsel, the Supreme Court, dis-
tinguishing Betts and citing Powell, held
that regardless of whether the sixth amend-
ment required that counsel be appointed,
at the very least his right to be heard
through his own counsel was unqualified.
This was soon followed by the Court of
Military Appeals' decision of United
States v. Gunnels.49 At a preliminary in-
vestigation, the defendant had been in-
formed of the charges against him and
of his privilege against self-incrimination,
but, upon application to the staff judge ad-
47 Id. at 142.
,48 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
49 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
Accord, United States v. Rose, 8 U.S.C.M.A.
441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).
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vocate, he was refused any advice regard-
ing the right to counsel. In reversing the
conviction by the general court-martial,
the Court of Military Appeals held that
while the right of assigned counsel exists
only in criminal proceedings, as distin-
guished from an investigation, a suspect
has the right to be given legal advice by
the staff judge advocate, or in the alter-
nate, by civilian counsel. Since the ac-
cused was given no advice whatsoever
regarding the right to counsel, this latter
alternative of advice by civilian counsel
was, in effect, unknown to the defendant.
United States v. Jacoby 50 stands on a
par with Burns for the sheer breadth of
its statements as to the applicability of
the Bill of Rights to the military. There,
the defendant had been convicted at a
special court-martial of uttering worthless
checks on the basis of written interroga-
tories without the opportunity of con-
frontation of witnesses and sentenced, in
part, to a bad conduct discharge. In re-
versing the intermediate review board,
the Court of Military Appeals held that the
taking of depositions without the presence
of the accused's counsel was a violation
of the sixth amendment. It noted that
"it is apparent that the protections in the
Bill of Rights, except those which are
expressly or by necessary implication in-
applicable, are available to members of
our armed forces." " Even more interest-
ing, however, is the statement by the
court that "the historical development of
military practice and subsequent enact-
50 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960).
51Jd. at 430-31, 29 C.M.R. at 246-47.
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ments of Congress have little bearing on
the contemporaneous meaning of the
Sixth Amendment." 52
Three years later the Supreme Court
took further steps in advancing the civil
right to counsel. In Gideon v. Wain-
wright,58 an indigent defendant was con-
victed of a felony by a state court over
his objection that counsel was not ap-
pointed to represent him. In overruling
Betts, the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment's assistance of counsel
provision was an essential requisite of a
fair trial and as such made obligatory on
the states by the fourteenth amendment.
5 4
Subsequently, the Court of Military
Appeals decided United States v. Culp 5
This case involved a defendant who was
tried by a special court-martial and who,
upon his plea of guilty, was sentenced,
in part, to a bad conduct discharge. The
52 Id. at 433, 29 C.M.R. at 249. A strong dis-
sent stated that if "the framers of the Con-
stitution entrusted to Congress the task of strik-
ing a precise balance between the rights of men
in the service and the overriding demands of
discipline and duty . . . we must not reject the
expression of Congress merely because we be-
lieve the civilian system offers a better scale."
Id. at 441, 29 C.M.R. at 257.
53 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51 See aiso Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), requiring counsel on an appeal
as of right. Clearly a person may appeal from
a military court-martial as a matter of right.
Once the court-martial's convening authority has
taken final action, the entire record of every
general court-martial case and that of every
special court-martial approving a bad conduct
discharge is sent to the appropriate Judge Ad-
vocate General to be reviewed by a board of
review. 10 U.S.C. §865(a)-(b) (1964). All
other special and summary court proceedings are
reviewed by a judge advocate as prescribed by
regulation. 10 U.S.C. § 865(c) (1964).
-'5 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
board of review set aside the sentence on
the determination that the defendant's
plea of guilty was improvident and that
the defendant had been deprived of his
sixth amendment rights where they had
not been intelligently waived, and that
defense counsel had consisted of non-
certified officers. Although the Court of
Military Appeals reversed the decision of
the board, the three opinions filed in sup-
port of the reversal differed as to reason-
ing. One judge argued that, in light of
the common law at the time of its adop-
tion and its subsequent history, the sixth
amendment's assistance of counsel pro-
vision has always been inapplicable to
trials by court-martial. Since the sixth
amendment did not apply, the judge then
directed his reasoning to the qualifications
of counsel as set forth in the UCMJ and
found that the defense counsel met the
requirements of articles 27 and 38(b)
of the UCMJ.
The Chief Judge argued that the sixth
amendment is applicable to trials by
either general or special courts-martial
but that such requirements were satisfied
by appointment of counsel pursuant to
the UCMJ since presumptive skill
matched actual performance so that com-
petent counsel was a reality. In addition,
he noted that in all cases where a special
court-martial had imposed a bad conduct
discharge, an automatic review was pro-
vided with the possibility existing of a
further review by the Court of Military
Appeals.
The third judge, concurring in the
opinion of the Chief Judge that the sixth
amendment was applicable to military
proceedings, felt that the defendant here
had not been deprived of his rights since
he had chosen his own counsel. He also
questioned the desirability of continuing
to permit non-lawyers to practice before
tribunals where bad conduct discharges
could be imposed. Thus, although the
court recognized the applicability of the
sixth amendment to military proceedings,
the court failed to designate the standard
to be applied.56
Further questions relating to assistance
of counsel were raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.5 7
The Court held that where the petitioner
had been taken into custody and had
begun to become the focal point of in-
quiry as to the commission of a crime,
had asked for and been denied the right
to consult with his own attorney and had
not been warned by the police of his
right to remain silent, the accused had
been denied the assistance of counsel.
The Court of Military Appeals, in
United States v. Wimberly,5" refused to
follow Escobedo and instead adhered to
the traditional voluntary-involuntary ap-
proach regarding confessions, as advo-
cated by the dissent in Escobedo. Here
the court found a confession to be volun-
tary although made only four days after
another confession which was found to
be involuntary. Between the first and
second confessions, the defendant had
been advised of all his rights, but, due to
his ignorance as to the inadmissibility of
his first confession, reconfessed when re-
quested. Over the defendant's objections,
his conviction by a general court-martial
was affirmed. The Court of Military Ap-
. c,See note 39, supra.
57 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
58 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 36 C.M.R. 159 (1966).
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peals cited Escobedo as establishing noth-
ing new for the military, at least in re-
gard to the admissibility of statements
made after the police had denied a re-
quest to consult with counsel. As to cus-
todial interrogations where the accused
has not requested counsel, the court rec-
ognized that there were currently varied
interpretations of Escobedo in this re-
spect 59 and concluded that nothing indi-
cated "that the only feasible way to give
maximum effect to the Constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel is that
the accused have counsel beside him dur-
ing police questioning." 60
Some questions left in doubt by
Escobedo were settled by Miranda v.
Arizona.61 Here the Supreme Court held
that prior to any custodial interrogation,
the accused must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any state-
ment made can be used against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed,
unless such right be waived voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently. It should be
noted that the Supreme Court there cited
with approval the self-incrimination pro-
visions of the UCMJ,62 the United States
v. Gunnels 63 and United States v. Rose 64
decisions for the proposition that
"Id]enial of the right to consult counsel
.9Lane, Miranda in Uniform, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
10, 1967, at 1, col. 3-4.
60 United States v. Wimberly, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 3,
10, 36 C.M.R. 159, 166 (1966).
61384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6,2 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1964).
63 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
See text accompanying note 49, supra.
64 8 U.S.C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957).
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during interrogation has also been pro-
scribed by military tribunals." (5
In Kennedy v. Commandant,6" the in-
stant case, the defendant appealed from
the denial of a writ of habeas corpus
brought on the ground that the military
courts lost jurisdiction in imposing a sen-
tence in a special court-martial where the
accused was represented by non-legally
trained counsel. Aside from this sixth
amendment claim, the defendant argued
that a fair trial had been denied in that,
since he was unable to afford civilian
counsel, the UCMJ provision which per-
mits the accused to hire civilian counsel
at his own expense67 invidiously dis-
criminated against the poor in violation
of the fifth amendment.
Since the defendant had conceded that
the elements of jurisdiction in the class-
ical sense existed, the Court had to con-
sider only the question of whether the
accused was per se deprived of any con-
stitutionally guaranteed right. Historically
it found no support for applying the sixth
amendment to military prosecutions and
saw no need to determine its current
applicability. Moreover, while the crime
was one of moral turpitude, the penalty
was equivalent to a misdemeanor at civil
law. Since the applicability of the sixth
amendment in such cases was still an
open question, 8 the Court felt it need
65Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 489 &
n. 63.
66377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
67 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964).
68 See the opinion of Justice Fortas, dissenting
from the denial of a writ of certiorari in
Heller v. Connecticut, # 115 B73 CCH (1967)
stating the issue to be: "whether we should
now hold that the constitutional guarantees of
counsel applies to the present case and to
not now decide whether such amendment
was applicable to the military, since in
any event the UCMJ complied fully with
that amendment's provisions. Further-
more, the Court noted that the trial coun-
sel was equally trained, that the sentenc-
ing power of special courts-martial was
limited, and that every officer must be
familiar with the UCMJ and the Manual
for Courts-Martial such that the fifth
amendment was satisfied.69
Finally, the Court found that petitioner
had not been denied military due process
since the counsel appointed and the trial
received had already been deemed to sat-
isfy the sixth and fifth amendments re-
spectively. Satisfaction of these constitu-
tional provisions ipso facto precluded any
possibility that he could have been pre-
judiced by his inability to obtain private
counsel.70
In United States v. Tempia,71 the ac-
cused was tried by a general court-martial
and sentenced, in part, to a bad-conduct
discharge. Prior to custodial interroga-
other relatively 'minor' offenses or misdemean-
ors carrying significant penalties for their viola-
tion." Id. at 74. Thus, a number of opposite
conclusions have been reached in this area.
Those arguing for the applicability state that
it is implicit in Gideon (see, e.g., Harvey v.
Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965)) and
those holding the contrary argue that it would
place an intolerable burden on the legal struc-
ture (see, e.g., Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1154,
397 S.W.2d 365 (1965)).
The relationship of this conflict to military pro-
ceedings lies, of course, in the area of special
courts-martial whose scope is limited to penal-
ties that would be meted out for misdemeanors
at civil law. See note 37, supra.
60 Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339, 343-
44 (10th Cir. 1967).
701d. at 344.
71 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
tion, defendant had sought legal advice
from the Staff Judge Advocate. The ad-
vice was given, but the Staff Judge Ad-
vocate refused to enter into an attorney-
client relationship since such would de-
prive him from acting in his official
capacity. Defendant was told that he had
the right to retain civilian counsel at his
own expense, that no military lawyer
would represent him during the investiga-
tory stages, but that he would be furn-
ished military counsel if charges were
preferred. At the interrogation held im-
mediately thereafter, the defendant con-
fessed.
The Court premised its reversal on the
ground that, even though military law has
a separate existence, members of the
armed services, by their mere status, are
not deprived of all the protections of the
Bill of Rights. The Court reasoned that
constitutional safeguards, unless expressly
or impliedly inapplicable, encompassed
the military and that since Miranda laid
down principles constitutional in scope,
it was binding on the military.12
Pursuant thereto, it found these stand-
ards not to have been satisfied where the
accused had been told that no lawyer
would be appointed to represent him at
the custodial interrogation and that the
availability of consultation with private
attorneys was limited to attorneys whom
he could employ at his own expense. The
burden was now on the government to
provide counsel for the accused, not only
at the court-martial but also at the cus-
todial interrogation. While it noted that
Miranda allowed for other procedures
that are at least as effective in warning
72 Id. at 634-35.
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the accused of his right to silence, it
found that procedures heretofore em-
ployed were not such equivalent meth-
ods. 7
3
A concurring opinion reiterated the
fact that decisions by the Supreme Court
of constitutional import, of which Miran-
da was one, are binding on even military
tribunals, but further added that any
denial of the accused's rights are subject
to review by habeas corpus proceedings
in civil court.
74
The Chief Judge, in his dissent, noted
that Miranda had been, in part, based
upon the military procedure relating to
warning of rights and right to counsel at
trials. Even if this were not the case, the
military procedures were equivalently ef-
fective means, and that even though the
attorney-client relationship was not
formed, the defendant was told of all his
legal rights and right to counsel which
is all that any attorney can do.
Tempia unequivocally adds two consti-
tutional rights to those already possessed
by servicemen. As enunciated in Miran-
da, as of June 13, 1966, the accused who
has been made the subject of custodial
interrogation has the right to the pres-
ence of an attorney and, secondly, the
right to have counsel provided if he is
indigent.
At this point, the clarity of the holding
in Tempia ends. Questions now arise as
to what the Court meant by counsel-
whether it is either a lawyer or a non-
legally trained officer and whether the
decision was intended to apply only in
7 ld. at 639-40.
7Id. at 640. See 28 U.S.C. §2241 (1964).
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the case of a general court-martial. With
respect to both questions, the Court mere-
ly stated that past procedures were de-
fective, citing Miranda, but did not elab-
orate as to whether an attorney, if not
certified as competent or legally trained,
would be sufficient to satisfy the sixth
amendment in the event the defendant
was subject to trial by general court-
martial. In all likelihood, advice by such
counsel would be insufficient. The ques-
tion now arises whether such advice
would be sufficient where the accused is
subject to trial by a special court-martial,
which has the authority to levy punish-
ment equivalent to that of a misdemeanor
at civil law.
Thus, while the Court has determined
that the sixth amendment applies to cus-
todial interrogation, it has failed to set
forth what constitutes compliance as to
the type of representation required, es-
pecially in regard to a special court-
martial proceeding. Kennedy, on the
other hand, while professing uncertainty
as to the applicability of the sixth amend-
ment, still managed to set forth a stand-
ard that would satisfy the amendment.
Although it was a special court-martial
with the right to counsel at a military
trial that was this Court's focal point of
inquiry, it is significant that it held that
the UCMJ provisions for qualification of
counsel do comply with the sixth amend-
ment whereas previous decisions either
held that the sixth amendment was in-
applicable to the military or that the
sixth amendment is applicable and its
requirements were not met by the UCMJ.
An apparent conflict between the two
cases seemingly exists. In Kennedy it
was held that no constitutional rights are
infringed by the refusal to permit the
accused to obtain his own legally trained
counsel when he is able to pay for it.
In Tempia, which concerned appointment
at the pre-trial level, it was specifically
held that failure to appoint counsel for
an indigent was violative of the Constitu-
tion. However, the two cases are distin-
guishable in so far as Tempia is con-
cerned with the otherwise outright denial
of such a right whereas Kennedy relates
to the obtaining of possibly superior
counsel where the right to appointed
counsel already existed.
A more important issue raised by these
decisions is whether felons and misde-
meanants are to be afforded the same
measure of legal assistance both at the
trial and the investigatorial phase. Ken-
nedy answered the question in the nega-
tive, stating that appointment of equally
competent but non-legally trained counsel
under the UCMJ fully satisfied all of the
accused's rights. This broad language
would seem to be diametrically opposed
to the Tempia holding that an accused's
rights to the assistance of counsel do not
end with the UCMJ; constitutional man-
dates require their extension into the in-
vestigatorial stage. A reconciliation might
lie in the fact that despite Kennedy's
broad language as to the completeness
of the accused's rights under the UCMJ,
it was dealing solely with the trial itself.
Its value as precedent for the theory that
misdemeanants are not entitled to the
same counsel rights as felons on trial is
therefore enhanced.
Thus, it would appear that Kennedy
provides a necessary supplement to the
principles expounded in Tempia so that
in concert they make significant strides
in the application and clarification of the
sixth amendment to the armed forces. As
a result of these cases, at the very least,
the accused in the military has the right
to counsel, either retained or appointed, at
both the investigatory and trial stage. The
CHURCH - STATE
(Continued)
Ariz. I 7; Ind. 1 8; Ore. 1 7; Wash.
1 6; Ky. 232.
14. Unlike Maryland, eleven states
provide in their constitutions that reli-
gious tests for jurors are forbidden. Cf.
Md. DR. 36.
Ariz. II 12; Cal. I 4; Mo. I 5; N.D.
I 4; Ore. I 6; Tenn. I 6; Utah I 4;
Wash. I 11; W. Va. III 11; Wyo.
I 18; N.M. VII 3.
15. The constitutions of forty-six (46)
of the remaining states in the Union have
reference to a Supreme Being in the
preamble:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Ida-
ho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, [Mary-
land], Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
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remaining questions posed are whether
this right is also applicable to special
courts-martial, and, if so, is counsel in
the sense of a lawyer, as distinguished
from an officer familiar with the UCMJ
and the Manual for Courts-Martial,
required.
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
Tennessee has no express reference in
the preamble to its constitution, but sub-
mits various dates in the language, "the
year of our Lord."
No references whatsoever may be
found in the New Hampshire or Oregon
constitutions.
Vermont's constitution has no pre-
amble.
[It is important to note that many of
the prohibitions and guarantees mentioned
above, which may not appear in the con-
stitutions of the several states, are in-
cluded among subsequent legislative
enactments. See, e.g., bracketed nota-
tion to note 1].
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(Continued)
in revamping outmoded legal procedures
generally and in encouraging more wide-
spread use of group practice for those
well above the poverty line but too poor
to afford effective and continuing legal
representation."6
Today, it is generally conceded that
though indigents cannot even begin to
think about hiring a lawyer, middle-in-
come people in the big cities, especially,
will also think twice before doing so.
36 Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons of Legal
Services-l, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 267, 277
(1965).
LAY ATTORNEYS
(Continued)
an affirmative decision that it also be
affirmed on appeal except in those cases
where the facts in no way support the
decision of the court of first instance or
where there has been a gross violation of
procedural law. They argue that the
court of first instance is better prepared
to grant a just decision because it has
had all the parties before it. And ulti-
mately, who is to say that three prudent
men in Pittsburgh are more or less wise
than three prudent men in Chicago, New
York or San Francisco in reaching a
The cost of an urban lawyer's services,
except for real estate closings where
cash in hand or a new home tend to
give a glow to the transaction, or personal
injury litigation, where almost everyone
recovers, for most citizens is usually
disproportionate to the results achieved,
and, therefore, a luxury item.
The fault in most cases is not attribu-
table to the lawyer himself. He has no
choice but to charge for the many hours
he spends in a lower court, not to speak
of the discourtesies he endures, waiting
for a calendar call on a single claim
worth one or two thousand dollars. The
fault, instead, lies with an archaic and
rigid system which, in practice, imposes
a sacrosanct attorney-client relationship
on all except the truly affluent.
decision on the validity of a marriage. If
we are not prepared to change Canon
1014 in favor of the person, and if we
cannot change Pur system of appeals,
perhaps this suggestion can be the first
step in giving a new and greater hope to
those who seek the justice of the
ecclesiastical tribunal.
(6) Finally, unlike the common law
with which the lay advocate is familiar,
they find our law too strict and rigid.
There is little room for creativity. Like
the common law, they feel that canon law
ought to live and breathe and realistically
reflect the needs of our people within the
context of their existential experience.
In conclusion we might inquire as to
the future of the lay advocate in our
judicial system. We in Pittsburgh are
unqualifiedly convinced of their impor-
tance and the great contribution which
they have made and will continue to
make to our sense of justice. In our first
meeting with the lay advocates, Bishop
Wright held out the hope that some day
some of these men and women would sit
as judges in our courts and even in the
position of officilia. At a recent sym-
posium in New York where the possi-
DEFAMATION
(Continued)
arisen. To be effective and meaningful,
this advisor must be an active participant
in the day-to-day functioning of the
publication without, however, becoming an
overbearing censor. The implementation
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bility of a constitution for the Church
was considered, it was recommended that
the only qualification for participation in
the judicial structure of the Church be
professional competency without any dis-
crimination on the grounds of sex or
clerical status. In introducing lay advo-
cates into our court, we feel that we in
Pittsburgh will be eminently prepared to
meet the challenge and hope of using
competent laymen in the total judicial
system of the Church.
of such a recommendation is essentially
a non-legal problem insofar as it involves
a delicate balance between the indepen-
dence of the student writer and the un-
questioned right of the institution to
protect itself. The difficulties involved,
however, do not lessen the need for
such a program.
